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Abstract
We develop a model of the daily return-volume relationship which incorporates
information and liquidity shocks. First, we distinguish between two trading strate-
gies, information-based and liquidity-based trading and suggest that their respective
impacts on returns and volume should be modeled diﬀerently. Second, we integrate
the microstructure setting of Grossman and Miller (1988) with the information ﬂow
perspective of Tauchen and Pitts (1983) and derive a modiﬁed MDH model with two
latent factors related to information and liquidity. Our model explains how the liquidity
frictions can increase the daily traded volume, in the presence of liquidity arbitragers.
Finally, we propose a stock-speciﬁc liquidity measure using daily return and volume
observations of FTSE100 stocks.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we develop a model of the daily return-volume relationship which takes into
account both information and liquidity shocks. To do so, we reconcile the information ﬂow
perspective of the mixture of distribution hypothesis (MDH) with the microstructure setting
of Grossman and Miller (1988) which captures market liquidity. We develop a modiﬁed MDH
model with two latent factors related to information and liquidity shocks.
Several empirical studies [see Ying (1966), Crouch (1970), Clark (1973), Copeland (1976),
Copeland (1977), Epps and Epps (1976), Westerﬁeld (1977), Rogalski (1978), Tauchen and
Pitts (1983), Harris (1982), Harris (1986) and Harris (1987)] of both futures and equity mar-
kets ﬁnd a positive association between price variability1 and the contemporaneous trading
volume2 at the daily frequency. The usual theoretical explanation of this positive volume-
return volatility relation comes from microstructure models which analyze how information
is disseminated into prices, and how market prices convey information. Thus, several models
predict a positive return volatility-volume relation that depends on the rate of information
ﬂow and the interaction between specialists, informed and liquidity traders [Kyle (1985),
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), Diamond and Verrechia (1987),
Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Foster and Viswanathan
(1993) and Easley et al. (1996)], the market size [Gallant et al. (1992)] or the existence of a
short sales constraint [Diamond and Verrechia (1987)].
The mixture of distribution hypothesis (MDH) models attempt to explore the microstruc-
ture framework in which information asymmetries and liquidity needs motivate trade in re-
sponse to information arrivals. The MDH, pioneered by Clark (1973) and extended by Harris
(1982), Tauchen and Pitts (1983) and Andersen (1996) among others, provides an explana-
tion of the positive correlation between volume and the squared value of price change at
a daily frequency. For example, Clark (1973) model assumes that events important to the
1As measured by either the square price change or the price change per se.









































0pricing of a security occur at a random rate through time. It appears that price data are
generated by a conditional normal stochastic process with a changing variance parameter
that can be proxied by volume whose distribution is assumed to be lognormal. Clark (1973)
shows that the lognormal-normal mixture outperforms several members of stable family. Us-
ing the same assumption, Harris (1982), Harris (1986), Harris (1987) and Tauchen and Pitts
(1983) show that the joint distribution of daily price changes and volume can also be modeled
by a mixture of bivariate normal distributions. They assume that both variables (the daily
price change and daily volume) are conditioned by the rate of information which is random
and serially uncorrelated. Assuming a lognormal distribution for the mixing variable, the
model can be estimated by maximum likelihood [see Tauchen and Pitts (1983) for further
discussion]. As pointed out by Harris (1982), Harris (1986) and Harris (1987), the MDH
can explain the fat tailed probability distribution of the daily price change, and the positive
correlation between return volatility and volume. The standard MDH models assume that
information inﬂow drives the positive volatility-volume relationship.
If earlier tests ﬁnd evidence supportive of the MDH model [Clark (1973), Epps and Epps
(1976), Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Harris (1982), Harris (1986) and Harris (1987)], later
studies are less favorable [Heimstra and Jones (1994), Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1994),
Richardson and Smith (1994), and Andersen (1996)]. Diﬀerent authors propose various ex-
tensions of the standard MDH model in order to improve its explicative power. Lamoureux
and Lastrapes (1994) extension assumes that the information-arrival rate is serially corre-
lated3. Andersen (1996) develops a modiﬁed MDH model that includes a conditional Poisson
distribution for the trading process and a volume component that is not information sen-
sitive. His tests suggest that the modiﬁed version signiﬁcantly outperforms the standard
MDH, which assumes that both returns and volume are normally distributed.
3However their model fails to explain GARCH persistence in return variance. Their ﬁnding is consistent
with the results of Richardson and Smith (1994), who used the generalized method of moments (GMM) to
test the mixture model but did not account for time dependencies in the data. Thus, the evidence against the










































0Previous MDH tests are performed under the assumption that markets are perfectly
liquid and the impact of liquidity frictions on the volatility-volume relation is disregarded.
However, several studies show that liquidity shocks are priced by the market [see Amihud
(2002), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) among others] and that they impact both returns
and traded volume [see Chordia et al. (2001), Chordia et al. (2000), and Darolles and Fol
(2005)]. In particular, as discussed by Darolles and Fol (2005), some large investors, such as
Hedge Funds, play the role of liquidity arbitragers by tracking price pressures due to liquidity
frictions and entering the market in order to provide immediacy and to cash the liquidity
premium. Their intervention tends to correct price imperfections due to liquidity shocks and
thus lowers the intra-day return volatility. Once the prices are back to their fully revealing
information level, the arbitrage traders will liquidate their positions in order to beneﬁt from
the price reversals. As a consequence, the volume they trade adds to the volume that would
prevail in the absence of liquidity frictions.
It follows that the observed daily traded volume of a particular stock is the result of both
information-based trading and liquidity arbitragers. Thus, understanding and decomposing
the traded volume can give some insights concerning the market liquidity. In particular, the
raw traded volume is commonly used in the literature as a proxy for liquidity risk or market
quality [Gallant et al. (1992), Domowitz and Wang (1994), Gourieroux and Fol (1998)].
However, more recent studies are less favorable to the idea that the raw traded volume is an
eﬃcient measure of liquidity. For example, Borgy et al. (2010) point out that price-impact
based indicators are more accurate than raw traded volume in order to identify liquidity
problems in the currency exchange (FX) market. In this paper, we suggest that total daily
volume can be misleading since, in the presence of liquidity arbitragers, liquidity frictions
can be associated with higher volume.
These observations motivate us to extend the standard MDH model framework by in-
corporating liquidity eﬀects on daily stock returns and traded volume. To do so, we focus









































0crostructure model that captures the essence of market liquidity. They consider two types
of market participants. The ﬁrst one trades in response to information shocks and can be
assimilated to the active traders of Tauchen and Pitts (1983). The second type of traders
enters the market to exploit the presence of the liquidity events and will be called liquidity
arbitragers. A liquidity event is represented by a temporary order imbalance due to trade
asynchronization among the active traders. In the presence of a liquidity event, trades occur
at two dates. At time 1, the liquidity arbitragers observe price imperfections due to the order
imbalance among the active traders and enter the market to provide immediacy. At time
2, they liquidate their positions as other active traders arrive to the market with opposite
order imbalances4. The Grossman and Miller (1988) model implies that the volume traded
by liquidity arbitragers at date 2 increases the aggregated traded volume.
Using the implications of the Grossman and Miller (1988) model at an aggregated level
across times 1 and 2, we include an additional latent mixing variable L in the model of
Tauchen and Pitts (1983) to take into account the liquidity shocks which are supposed
to arrive randomly within the trading day. Our modiﬁed MDH model with two latent
variables − called the MDHL model − permits us to decompose the trading volume into two
components driven respectively by information and liquidity. Moreover, following Richardson
and Smith (1994), we propose a direct test of the modiﬁed MDH model. Indeed, the model
imposes restrictions on the joint moments of price changes and volume as a function of only
a few parameters. It is then possible to form overidentifying restrictions. These restrictions
can be tested using the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure of Hansen (1982).
Based on FTSE100 stock daily return and volume time series ranging from January 2005 to
July 2007, we show that the MDHL model with two latent factors outperforms the standard
MDH, suggesting that the inclusion of a latent liquidity variable may reconcile previous
divergent results found in the literature.
4Note that, Grossman and Miller (1988) assume that if all the active traders were present at time 1, there









































0The contribution5 of this paper is threefold. First, it distinguishes between two trad-
ing strategies, information-based trading and liquidity arbitrage, and suggests that their
respective impacts on returns and traded volume should be modeled diﬀerently. The for-
mer is incorporated into the daily price changes and traded volume and drives the positive
volatility-volume relationship. The latter impacts the intraday price variations and volumes
but does not aﬀect the daily price changes, while increasing the daily traded volume. Al-
though previous literature distinguishes between active traders and liquidity providers [see
for example Grossman and Miller (1988)], we are the ﬁrst to use the arbitrage trading impact
on individual stock returns and volume in order to decompose the total traded volume into
two components due to information and liquidity shocks. To do so, we blend the Grossman
and Miller (1988) microstructure framework into the Tauchen and Pitts (1983) standard
MDH and develop a two-latent factor model accounting for information inﬂow and liquidity
frictions. Second, we use a structural model, the MDHL model herein proposed, to exploit
the volume-volatility relation in order to extract a stock-speciﬁc liquidity measure µla
v us-
ing daily data. Finally, the MDHL model conﬁrms previous studies by implying a positive
volatility-volume relation driven by the common dependence of the observables on the in-
formation ﬂow. However, in our framework, this positive correlation does not depend on
the total traded volume but is function of the volume component due to information-based
trading µat
v after controlling for the impact of liquidity shocks µla
v . The standard MDH model
appears to be a special case of the MDHL model in the absence of liquidity frictions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy present the standard MDH
model based on the Tauchen and Pitts (1983) framework. In Section 3, we develop our
model. We ﬁrst summarize the Grossman and Miller (1988) microstructure framework, and
then discuss its implications concerning aggregated data. Finally, we develop a modiﬁed
MDH model accounting for both information and liquidity shocks. In Section 4, we present
the GMM tests and discuss the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.










































02 The standard MDH model (Tauchen and Pitts (1983))
This section provides a brief summary of the standard MDH model based on the theoretical
framework of Tauchen and Pitts (1983), henceforth TP6. The model considers a simple econ-
omy with only one risky asset and J active traders. J is ﬁxed over time. Each trading day,
the market experiences a series of diﬀerent Walrasian within-day equilibria; the information
inﬂow triggers market progression from one equilibrium to the next7. No assumptions are
made concerning liquidity problems since, in the TP economy, assets are deemed perfectly
liquid.
The authors ﬁrst assume that the number of within-day equilibria It is random since
the number of new pieces of information hitting the market varies signiﬁcantly across the
trading days. Using, in addition, a variance-component model for the trader’s reservation
price increments, TP demonstrate that the intraday price change and the traded volume,
denoted respectively by ∆Pi and Vi (i = 1,...,It) are normally distributed:
∆Pi ∼ N(0,σ
2
p), Vi ∼ N(µv,σ2
v), (2.1)
where price increment variance σ2
p as well as volume mean and variance parameters denoted
respectively by µv and σ2
v are given in Appendix A.
In order to illustrate the TP model’s world mechanism, we consider a simple example
given in Figure 1. Let It be the number of intra-day equilibria of the t-th trading day and
Pt−1 be the closing price of the previous trading day. To show how intra-day price varies in
response to the inﬂow of new information, we assume that only three pieces of information
arrive in the course of day t, I1, I2 and I3. Should I1 be perceived as good news, the trader’s
expected value for the risky asset will increase resulting in a new equilibrium price P1 > Pt−1;
in this case the price increment due to the arrival of I1, ∆P1, is positive. I2 being seen as
6A more detailed presentation of the TP model is provided in Appendix A.
7According to TP, "the intervals between successive equilibria are not necessarily of the same length;
since buy/sell orders are executed sequentially, many actual transactions at the exchange can comprise what




































































Figure 1: Day t price change as a function of intra-day price variations due to information shocks.
bad news, the next price increment ∆P2 is negative. Lastly, I3, which turns out to be good
news, initiates the movement to the third intra-day equilibrium and ∆P3 is positive. At the
end of day t, we observe the daily price increment ∆Pt = P3 −Pt−1. The daily price change
is the sum of intra-day price increments due to the arrival of the new information. More
generally, summing the within-day price changes and trading volumes, we obtain the day-t








Both ∆Pt and Vt appears to be mixtures of independent normals with the same mixing
variable It. Conditional on It, the daily price change ∆Pt is N(0,σ2
pIt) and the daily volume
is N(µvIt,σ2















































0where Z1t and Z2t are i.i.d. standard normal variables and mutually independent. At the
end of the day t, all the incoming information is incorporated into the price change ∆Pt and
traded volume Vt. From (2.3)-(2.4), it follows that the contemporaneous relation between
∆P 2
t and Vt is:
Cov(∆P
2
t ,Vt) = σ
2
pµvV ar[It] > 0. (2.5)
Following TP, volume and prices can only change through the information arrival process.
The TP framework is appealing as it deﬁnes an interesting factorial structure that we aim
at extending to incorporate a liquidity shock arrival process.
3 Our theoretical framework
Based on the theoretical analysis of Grossman and Miller (1988), henceforth GM, we modify
the standard MDH model by incorporating the eﬀect of market liquidity on volatility-volume
relationship. In our framework, we use "liquidity arbitragers" to refer to a particular family
of liquidity providers who adopt a strategic behavior in order to take advantage of price
distortions due to liquidity frictions. The aim of liquidity arbitragers is to cash the liquidity
premium by oﬀsetting their positions once prices revealing the information are established.
In practice, many ﬁnancial actors, such as proprietary trading desks or Hedge Funds, may
play the role of liquidity arbitragers. In Subsection 1, we discuss the implications of the GM
framework concerning total price changes and traded volumes, i.e. price changes and volumes
related to information and liquidity shocks. In Subsection 2, we develop our modiﬁed MDH









































03.1 Modeling the impact of liquidity shocks on total returns and
volume
This paragraph adapts the GM model8 to our economy and discusses how it can be extended
to model the impact of intraday liquidity shocks on price changes and traded volumes. GM
focus on a market in which liquidity is modeled as being determined by the demand and
supply of immediacy. They consider two types of traders: the outside customers who trade
in response to information inﬂow, and the market makers who trade in response to liquidity
shocks. In our framework, the outside customers are called active traders as in TP and the
market makers of GM correspond to our liquidity arbitragers.
The GM model focuses on a single risky asset and considers only three dates (1, 2, and
3). Dates 1 and 2 are trading dates, while date 3 is introduced only as a terminal condition;
the liquidation value of the risky asset at date 3 is denoted by ˜ P3. Information concerning ˜ P3
is assumed to arrive before trading at period 1 and before trading at period 2. Let J be the
number of all the potential active traders in the market. The active trader j (j = 1,...,J) at
time 1 has an endowment of size zj in the security, which is inappropriate given the trade-
oﬀ between his risk preferences and information at that date. At period 1, some liquidity
frictions may arise because of asynchronization of order ﬂows. This will result in a temporary
order imbalance; if all the active participants were present in the market at date 1, the order
imbalance would vanish and the net trading demand would be zero at the current price.
Generally speaking, it is important to distinguish between:
(i) the aggregated endowment shock across active participants and across periods 1 and 2, by
deﬁnition equal to zero. If all the active traders were simultaneously present in the market
at date 1, there would be no liquidity event and the equilibrium price would reveal all the
available information about the future liquidation value of the asset;
8The GM model is presented in details in Appendix B. Here, we only report some important results
helping to understand trader motivations, as well as the implications of the GM model concerning total price














































zj  = 0, (3.1)
where J1 < J is the number of active traders being present in the market at date 1. In this
case, z represents a temporary order imbalance caused by trade asynchronization.
Liquidity arbitragers, who continuously observe the market, provide immediacy at date
1 by taking trading positions that they hold until date 2. At date 2, they liquidate their
positions as other active traders arrive with the opposite order imbalance.
Assuming exponential preferences for both types of traders, GM use backward induction
to obtain the optimal excess demands for active traders as well as liquidity arbitragers at
both dates. Then, given the market clearing conditions, the equilibrium price at period 1
denoted by P1 is:
P1 = E1 ˜ P3 −
zαV ar1(E2 ˜ P3)
1 + M
, (3.2)
where α represents trader preferences which are assumed to be identical for all market
participants, M is the number of liquidity arbitragers and V ar1(E2 ˜ P3) represents the risk
from the point of view of period 1 that P2 = E2 ˜ P3 is not known. From equation (3.2), the
equilibrium price at date 1 will deviate from the price revealing the information E1 ˜ P3 and






















































0Since the GM world assumes that liquidity arbitragers face a participation cost c > 0, their
number M will be ﬁnite, which implies a limited capacity in providing immediacy and a
deviation of P1 from its fully revealing information level E1 ˜ P3. As discussed by Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), funding liquidity constraints can also explain why the liquidity is not
fully provided.
Generally speaking, the GM framework focuses on the consequences of an order imbalance
on the intraday patterns of price change and transaction volume. At this stage, the model
shows that in the presence of liquidity frictions and exogenous transaction costs:
(i) the traded volume at date 1 is lower than it would have been if there were no order
imbalance |Qat
1 | < |z|.
(ii) the transaction price at date 1 deviates from its revealing information level (P1  = E1 ˜ P3).
However, from the assumptions that the order imbalance sums to zero across periods 1
and 2, and that the liquidity arbitragers oﬀset their positions at date 2, it follows that the
traded volume across dates 1 and 2 is higher than it would have been in the absence of
liquidity frictions if the condition M ≥ 1 is satisﬁed9.
A. Order imbalances and the price change
As discussed by TP, the trading day can be considered as a set of successive equilibria and
the movement from one equilibrium to the next is driven by the arrival of new information.
Let us consider a trading day consisting of only 2 information arrivals10. Let δi be an
indicator variable such as δi = 1 (i = 1,2) in the presence of order imbalances and δi = 0
(i = 1,2) otherwise. Here, we take δ1 = 1 and δ2 = 0, hence the trading day reduces to a
3-date process in the sense of GM. In other words, we assume that trade asynchronization
occurring just after the arrival of the ﬁrst piece of information (δ1 = 1) results in a 3-date
9In other words, the order imbalance faced by active traders who exchange at date 1 is oﬀset thanks to
immediacy provided by liquidity arbitragers who will liquidate their positions at date 2 and thus increase
the traded volume.
10In the next subsection we will generalize this simple example by allowing for multiple information arrivals









































0GM-process with the second piece of information arriving before trading at date 2 and ˜ P3
being the liquidation value of the asset at the end of the trading day.











which implies that: (i) for δ1 = 0, z1 =
 J
j=1z1j equals zero by deﬁnition, and (ii) for δ1 = 1
equation (3.12) is equivalent to equation (3.1).
Let P0 = E0 ˜ P3 be the price prevailing at the beginning of the trading day and E0 ˜ P3 =
E0E1 ˜ P3 be the expectation concerning ˜ P3 before the arrival of new information to the market.
From equation (3.2), the total price change at date 1 (i = 1), ∆P1 = P1 − P0, is:
∆P1 = (E1 ˜ P3 − E0 ˜ P3) −







where z1 is the order imbalance occurring at date 1, ∆P
′
1 = E1 ˜ P3 −E0 ˜ P3 is the price change
due to information hitting the market at date 1 and ∆P
′′
1 (z1) = −
z1αV ar1(E2 ˜ P3)
1+M is the price
change due to order imbalance at date 1. In the same way, the total price change at date 2,
∆P2 = P2 − P1, can be written as:
∆P2 = (E2 ˜ P3 − E1 ˜ P3) +









2 = E2 ˜ P3 − E1 ˜ P3 represents the price change due to information arrival at date 2
and −∆P
′′
1 (z1) represents the price adjustment as new active traders arrive at date 2 with
opposite order imbalance.














































0i.e. the impact of the order imbalance on the total price change vanishes; price variation due
to liquidity shocks and price adjustments oﬀset each other and the aggregated price change
is only due to information ﬂow.
Figure 2 illustrates how intraday price increments behave in response to both informa-
tion ﬂow and liquidity shocks in the simple example considered here. Suppose that the two
successive pieces of information reaching the market, denoted respectively by I1 and I2, are
perceived as good news. The intraday price behavior in the absence of liquidity shocks is
visually described by the dashed lines and corresponds exactly to Figure 1. Trade asynchro-
nization occurring just after the arrival of I1, results in a 3-date GM-process with I2 arriving
before trading at date 2 and date 3 being a terminal condition; the liquidation value of the
risky asset is ˜ P3.
Let ∆P
′
1 = E1 ˜ P3−P0 be the price increment due to I1, and ∆P
′′
1 (z1) be the price variation
due to the liquidity friction at date 1. As for I1, the active trader expectations concerning
˜ P3 will rise, resulting in a positive ∆P
′
1. The active traders face sell-side liquidity shortage
due to trade asynchronization at date 1 and the asset price increases more than if there were
no liquidity problems, resulting in a positive ∆P
′′
1 (z1).
In particular, the liquidity arbitragers observing the exchange enter the market to provide





where δ1 = 1. At date 2, the liquidity arbitragers enter the market to buy the stock at
P2 = P
′
2 = E2 ˜ P3 (the price revealing the information at date 2), as new active traders
arrive with the opposite order imbalance. The date-2-equilibrium price can be written:








1 (z1), where −∆P
′′
1 (z1) is the price adjustment as
new active traders arrive at date 2 to oﬀset the order imbalance. Since price distortion due
to liquidity event at date 1 and price variation due to liquidity adjustment cancel out, the
price returns to its fully revealing information level which corresponds also to the price that
would prevail in the absence of trade asynchronization at date 1 (as shown by the dashed
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Figure 2: Day t price change as a function of intra-day price ﬂuctuations due to information and liquidity
shocks.
the total price change and equation (3.8) is always satisﬁed.
B. Order imbalances and the traded volume
We focus on a simple trading day with two pieces of information and a unique order
imbalance occurring after the ﬁrst information arrival and discuss the impact of liquidity
frictions on the intraday traded volume. Let V1 (i = 1) be the total traded volume due to
the ﬁrst information arrival and the liquidity friction; it is the sum of the volume V
′
1 due
to information ﬂow and the volume V
′′
1 due to the intervention of liquidity arbitragers. As
discussed by GM, when a new piece of information hits the market, active traders, who
revise their expectations concerning the future liquidation value of the asset, are willing to
rebalance their positions in order to share risk through the market. Let z1j be the quantity

















































| z1j | . (3.9)
V
′
1 corresponds to the traded volume due to the ﬁrst piece of information (i = 1) in the TP
model. If all the active traders arrive simultaneously in the market at date 1, V
′
1 represents
the total traded volume due to the ﬁrst piece of information and equals V1.
Any liquidity event occurring at date 1, creates a temporary order imbalance. Since
the order imbalance sums to zero across periods 1 and 2, the liquidity arbitragers oﬀset
their positions at date 2 as other active traders arrive with the opposite order imbalance. It
follows that the total traded volume V1 is higher than V
′
1. The diﬀerence V
′′
1 is the amount of




From equation (3.4) or (3.3), V
′′










| z1 | . (3.10)









1 (z1) is used to denote the dependence of V
′′
1 on z1 as expressed in equation
(3.10). It follows that:
(i) In the absence of liquidity frictions (δ1 = 0) V
′′
1 = 0 and we obtain the TP model which
states that the total traded volume is completely explained by information inﬂow: V1 = V
′
1.
(ii) The occurrence of liquidity events (δ1 = 1) increases the total traded volume related
to the ﬁrst piece of information: V1 > V
′
1. This is due to the intervention of the liquidity









































0In conclusion, the liquidity shocks can increase the total traded volume11 but have no
impact on the total price change. This result motivates us to blend the GM model’s impli-
cations into the standard framework of TP in order to model the impact of liquidity events
on the daily price change and traded volume and thus separate the observed traded volume
into two parts due to information and liquidity.
3.2 A modiﬁed MDH model with information and liquidity shocks
This section develops the modiﬁed MDH model which takes into account both information
and liquidity shocks. Indeed, as discussed above, some liquidity frictions may arise from
trade asynchronization, even if the number of active traders J is large. The equilibrium
price then diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the price revealing the information, which motivates the
liquidity arbitragers to enter the market, provide immediacy and cash the liquidity premium.
We focus on a simple economy with a risk-free asset and a single risky security having a
liquidation value ˜ PT at the end of the trading day. The risk-free rate is normalized to zero.
To generalize the simple example of the previous subsection (based on the GM analysis) at
a daily frequency by allowing for multiple information arrivals within the trading day, we
consider each 3-date-process as a 2-trading-date (or 2-equilibria) process, henceforth GM
process, and report the terminal condition at the end of the trading day. There are only two
kinds of traders in the market: the active traders who trade in response to new information,
and the liquidity arbitragers who trade in response to liquidity frictions. The number of each
category of traders − respectively J and M − is nonrandom and ﬁxed over time. We then
assume that, within the day, the market passes through a sequence of distinct equilibria in
the sense of TP. The movement from one equilibrium to the next is initiated by the arrival
of new information to the market. Given the new information, the active traders decide to
rebalance their positions in order to share risk through the market. Let zij be the endowment
11At this stage of the analysis, for simplicity purpose, we make abstraction of the impact of the second
piece of information on the traded volume. Since in this simple example δ2 = 0, the volume due to the second
information arrival corresponds to that of TP for i = 2; This amount will be added to V1 when considering









































0shock of trader j (j = 1,...,J) given the ith piece of information (i = 1,...,It). As in TP, It
is assumed to be random since the number of pieces of information reaching the market each
day varies signiﬁcantly. If all the active traders are present in the market, the aggregated
endowment shock across traders is zero and the ith equilibrium price equals its fully revealing
information level.
However, if a liquidity event occurs, the aggregated endowment shock across the active
traders being present in the market (J1 < J) represents the order imbalance: zi =
 J1
j=1 zij  =
0. Liquidity arbitragers who observe this market imperfection enter the market in order to
provide immediacy and the trade is generated from a GM process. Date 1 of the GM-process
coincides with the ith piece of information and the equilibrium price at this date deviates
from the price revealing the information12. In order to denote the appartenance to the ith
within-day equilibrium, we index by i all the intraday variables of interest, such as price
changes, excess demands of traders, as well as traded volumes. In the previous subsection,
we introduced an indicator variable, δi, such as δi = 1 in the presence of liquidity frictions










zij, i = 1,...,It. (3.12)
In addition, we assume that zi ∼ N(0,σ2
z) when a liquidity event occurs (δi = 1) and zi = 0
otherwise (δi = 0).
Let us consider a GM-process debuting at the ith intraday equilibrium and comprising
of two successive information arrivals: the ith and the (i + 1)th pieces of information which
12If there were some noise (non-informed) traders at date 1 who trade in response to liquidity needs, it
would be possible for the arbitrage participants to liquidate their positions before the arrival of the next piece
of information by trading with the noise traders at date 1. Trade between strategic and non-strategic traders
would take place at a disadvantageous price for the noise traders who would bear, in that case, the liquidity
premium perceived by the liquidity arbitragers. Since we do not allow for the presence of noise traders in
our model, the liquidity arbitragers have to wait from period 1 to period 2 to trade as new active traders
arrive with the opposite order imbalance. For this reason, the arbitragers face the risk that a new piece










































0arrive respectively before trading at date 1 and before trading at date 2. We can now
generalize (3.6) and (3.7) by getting the corresponding price changes at each date ∆Pi (date











In these equations, ∆P
′
i = Ei ˜ PT − Ei−1 ˜ PT and ∆P
′
i+1 = Ei+1 ˜ PT − Ei ˜ PT represent price
changes due to information inﬂow, ∆P
′′
i (zi) = −
ziαV ari(E(i+1) ˜ PT)
1+M represents price distortion
due to the liquidity event occurring at date 1 and coinciding with the ith information arrival,
while −∆P
′′
i (zi) represents the price adjustment as other active traders arrive at date 2 with
the opposite order imbalance. The number of GM-processes within a trading day t, denoted
by Lt, corresponds to the number of liquidity events and is given by Lt =
 It
i=1 δi. Lt and It
are assumed to be conditionally independent Cov(Lt|It,It) = 0. Moreover, we suppose that
a liquidity event may occur at any intraday equilibrium of the trading day t except the last
one, which yields δIt = 0. This assumption is necessary for generalizing the GM 3-period
world at a daily frequency; for instance, for It = 2, i.e. 2 pieces of information and only one
liquidity event, we obtain the GM model as a particular case of our modiﬁed model.
Let Vi be the cumulated traded volume across periods 1 and 2 due to the ith piece of











j=1 | zij | is the traded volume due to the ith information arrival to the
market [see equation (3.9)], and V
′′





j=J1+1 zij | is the traded
volume due to the intervention of the liquidity arbitragers, as measured by the amount of
active traders that is completed by liquidity arbitragers at date 1 [see equation (3.10)]. If











































i would correspond to the traded volume implied by the standard MDH of TP at the
ith equilibrium of the trading day.
Generally speaking, ex-post, the GM-process includes the TP model as a particular case
in the absence of the liquidity events. The rapprochement can be done in two ways:
(i) a GM-process with new information hitting the market at date 2, corresponds to two
successive TP equilibria in the absence of liquidity frictions13.
(ii) in the absence of new information at date 2 and with no liquidity frictions, the GM-
process would be assimilated to a unique TP (ith) equilibrium.
Let now consider the traded volume Vi resulting from the ith information arrival and the
liquidity event occurring at the ith equilibrium, as given in equation (3.15). As discussed
above, the volume component V
′
i due to information is the same as that considered by TP.
As shown in Appendix A, TP demonstrate that the total traded volume V TP
i is due to the








| ψij − ¯ ψi |, (3.16)
where α is a constant, ψij is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
σ2








i of our model. TP show that, for large J, V TP
i is approximately normally



































J + o(J). (3.18)
13In order to facilitate the comparison between our model with liquidity frictions and the standard MDH
of TP and without any loss of generality, the active traders who were present at the ith equilibrium are also
allowed to trade as the (i + 1)th piece of information hits the market. This has no impact on the (i + 1)th
equilibrium price, but forces the traded volume due to information to equal the cumulated amount that























































| ψij − ¯ ψi | . (3.19)








(ψij − ¯ ψi). (3.20)
It follows that the variance of the order imbalance σ2















When a liquidity event occurs at the ith intraday equilibrium, only J1 out of J active
traders participate at the exchange. As discussed by TP, the ith equilibrium price change is
the average of the reservation price increments of active traders being present at the market.
Let ∆P ∗
ij be the reservation price of trader j (j = 1,...,J) at the ith equilibrium (i = 1,...,It).
Following TP, ∆P ∗
ij = φi+ψij with φi ∼ N(0,σ2



























































































0It follows that ∆P
′′
i is a normally distributed variable with mean zero and variance:
V ar(∆P
′′



















(ψij − ¯ ψi). (3.24)




Replacing (3.25) into (3.10) generalized to i = 1,...,It, we can show that the traded volume





i = a | ∆P
′′
i |, (3.26)
where a = α M
1+MJ1. Thus, V
′′
i is the absolute value (multiplied by a) of a normally distributed
variable ∆P
′′
i with mean zero and variance given in equation (3.23). The ﬁrst two moments
of V
′′



















2 ≡ V ar[∆V
′′













From (3.21) and (3.27) as well as the relation a = α M









when a liquidity event occurs and µla
v = 0 otherwise. This means that µla
v can be explained by
the combined eﬀect of the occurrence of order imbalance zi and the intervention of liquidity
arbitragers. The average traded volume due to liquidity frictions µla









































0of σz and M. The absence of liquidity events yields µla










when z = 0 and from equation (3.22) when J1 = J.
Generally speaking, summing the within-day price changes due to information ∆P
′
i and
the price imperfections due to lacks of liquidity ∆P
′′
i , as well as the liquidity adjustments
−∆P
′′

















Therefore, the intraday liquidity events do not impact the daily price change. As in TP, the











p). Consequently, only the information ﬂow impact is integrated in the
daily price change. In our model, by deﬁnition, there is no order imbalance at the last trading
date of the day (i.e., date It − 1). Thus, the closing price of the day reveals the information
available up to that date: PIt = EIt ˜ PT. Since the liquidation value of the asset ˜ PT is revealed
at the end of the trading day, the closing price EIt ˜ PT converges14 to the liquidation value of
the asset PT.
However, as discussed above, the volume traded by liquidity arbitragers adds to the
volume that would be traded in the absence of liquidity imperfections. Summing the within-
day traded volume motivated by information ﬂow V
′
i and the traded volume due to liquidity
shocks V
′′












14Indeed, during the trading day, thanks to the arrival of new information to the market, the equilibrium
price converges to the liquidation value of the asset that will prevail at the end of the trading day. Here, even
if this convergence is blurred by the presence of liquidity frictions at intraday frequency, it is successfully


























































where l = 1,...,Lt is a subsequence of i = 1,...,It such as δi = 1.
In this paper, we assume that It and Lt are conditionally independent Cov[(Lt|It),It] = 0
which implies that Cov(f(Lt|It),g(It)) = 0, where f(Lt|It) and g(It) can be any function
of Lt|It and It, respectively. We consider that the indicator variable δi is independently
drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter15 p. Then, Lt’s ﬁrst two unconditional16
moments are respectively: E(Lt) = pE(It) and V ar(Lt) = p(1 − p)E(It) + p2V ar(It). The
unconditional covariance between It and Lt is given by:
Cov(It,Lt) = pV ar(It). (3.32)
From equations (3.30) and (3.31), we obtain a mixture of distribution model with two






v )2 given in (3.28) can be considered as o(JJ1) when added to (σat
v )2 given




v )2It) without any loss of generality17. Henceforth, for notation simplicity,
we replace (σat
v )2 by σ2






v It + µ
la
v Lt + σv
 
ItZ2t, (3.34)
where Cov(∆Pt,Vt | It,Lt) = 0, and Z1t and Z2t are mutually independent standard normal
variables (and independent of It and Lt). Conditional on It, the daily price change is normally
distributed: ∆Pt ∼ N(0,σ2
pIt). Our model implies that the information ﬂow impacts both
15This means that for each i = 1,...,It, δi takes value 1 with success probability p and value zero with
failure probability (1 − p): δi ∼ B(p). Its ﬁrst two moments are E(δi) = p and V ar(δi) = p(1 − p).
16Since Lt =
 It
i=1 δi, conditional on It, Lt has a binomial distribution with parameters It and p: Lt|It ∼
B(It,p). Let E(It) and V ar(It) be the unconditional mean and variance of It.


















































0the daily price change and the traded volume, while only the daily volume is aﬀected by the
random liquidity shocks.
Note that the standard MDH of TP as well as the GM model are implied by (3.33)-(3.34)
as particular cases:
(i) When zi = 0, µla
v = 0 and the system (3.33)-(3.34) reduces to the standard MDH of TP;
(ii) If the trading day consists of only two trading periods and a terminal condition date as
in Figure 2, the bivariate mixture given in (3.33)-(3.34) reduces to the standard GM model.
From equations (3.32) and (3.33)-(3.34), the unconditional contemporaneous relation
between ∆P 2
t and Vt is:
Cov(∆P
2










The volatility-volume covariance predicted by our model is positive as is that of TP given
in (2.5). However, while in the TP world the average total volume µv is due to information,
in our model the average total volume is decomposed into two parts, µat
v and pµla
v , due to
information and liquidity shocks, respectively: µv = µat
v +pµla
v . Since TP do not account for
liquidity shocks, the standard MDH model may overestimate the average volume related to
information inﬂow: µv ≥ µat
v .
The model given in (3.34) is called the modiﬁed MDH model with liquidity (henceforth
MDHL model), and forms the basis of our empirical work. The particularity of this model is
that it takes into account both information and liquidity shocks. Based on the MDHL model,
we can exploit the volume-volatility correlation in order to decompose the traded volume for
a given stock into two components and thus separate information from the liquidity trading











































Our sample consists in all FTSE100 stocks listed on 10 July, 2007. Without any loss of
generality, we use the daily returns Rt instead of the daily (log) price change. We consider
the period from 4 January 2005 to 26 June 2007, i.e. 636 observation dates. We exclude
stocks with missing observations ending up with 93 stocks. Daily returns and transaction
volumes are extracted from Bloomberg databases. Following Darolles and Fol (2005), and
Bialkowski et al. (2008), we retain the turnover ratio as a measure for volume which con-
trols for dependency between the traded volume and the ﬂoat18. The latter represents the
diﬀerence between annual common shares outstanding and closely held shares for any given
ﬁscal year. Common and closely held shares are extracted from Factset databases. Let qkt
be the number of shares traded for asset k, k = 1,...,K on day t, t = 1,...,T, and Nkt the




Average Dispersion Min Max Average Dispersion Min Max
Mean 0,0007 0,0005 -0,0005 0,0024 0,0087 0,0052 0,0018 0,0405
Volatility 0,0137 0,0031 0,0074 0,0263 0,0065 0,0062 0,0011 0,0545
Skewness 0,2853 0,9271 -4,0840 3,1510 3,4636 1,7526 1,0041 9,8661
Kurtosis 9,9205 9,8313 3,2134 61,3788 28,4178 26,5025 4,8613 133,8895
(Return)2 with
Volume - - - - 0,42 0,14 0,17 0,75
Correlation
Table 1: Summary statistics for return and turnover across securities.
For each of the 93 stocks, we compute the empirical ﬁrst moments (mean, volatility,
18The turnover ratio seems to be appropriate when studying the market volume [?, ?, ?] or when comparing
individual asset volumes [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. However, Bialkowski et al. (2008) replace the number of shares









































0skewness and kurtosis) of volume and returns as well as the correlation between squared
returns and volume. The cross-security distribution of these statistics are summarized in
Table 1. The ﬁrst row reports the average, the dispersion, the minimum, and the maximum
of the means of returns and volume across the 93 stocks. The second row gives the same
cross-section statistics (average, dispersion, minimum and maximum) of the volatilities of
returns and volume, and so on for the skewness, kurtosis, and the correlation between squared
returns and volume. We perform a Pearson test to check the signiﬁcance of the correlation
coeﬃcients. These correlation coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcants for 92 over 93 stocks
at the 95% conﬁdence level. The statistics reported in the last row of Table 1 are computed
using only the statistically signiﬁcant correlations between squared returns and volume.
The implications of the MDH for the joint distribution of daily returns and volume, are
examined in details by Clark (1973), Westerﬁeld (1977), Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Harris
(1986), Harris (1987) among others. They assume that both variables (the daily (log) price
change and daily volume) are conditioned by a random and serially uncorrelated mixing
variable represented by the information ﬂow. They show that the MDH can explain why the
sample distribution of daily returns is kurtotic relative to the normal distribution, why the
distribution of the associated traded volume is positively skewed and kurtotic relative to the
normal distribution and why squared returns are positively correlated with trading volume.
The randomness of the mixing variable is crucial to the MDH analysis. If the mixing variable
were constant, there would be no reason to observe the above empirical patterns, and the
daily returns and volume should be mutually independent and normally distributed.
The results reported in Table 1 are then consistent with the MDH. The average and
minimum statistics of the volume skewness and squared return correlation with volume are
positive; and the average and minimum statistics of return and volume kurtosis are greater
then 3, as predicted by the mixture model. Moreover, these cross-security statistics are larger
than their corresponding constant mixing variable expected values19.
19The expected value of the volume skewness and correlation coeﬃcient is zero, and the expected value of









































0Finally, we present in Figure 3 the scatter plots of returns and squared returns against
turnover for two FTSE100 stocks: ANGLO AMERICAN (AAL LN) and AVIVA (AV LN).
The upper (lower) graphs are pairwise scatter plots for AAL LN (AV LN) with return-
turnover on the left, and volatility-turnover on the right. The graphs highlight the well-
documented positive20 relation between volatility and volume.











































































Figure 3: Scatter plots of returns and squared returns against turnover for two FTSE100 stocks: Anglo
American (AAL LN) and AVIVA (AV LN).
20Clark (1973), Copeland (1976), Copeland (1977), Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Harris (1982), Harris (1986),
Harris (1987), Epps and Epps (1976), and Westerﬁeld (1977) among others show a positive correlation









































04.2 The MDHL test
4.2.1 Test methodology
Following Richardson and Smith (1994), we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
of Hansen (1982) to test the validity of the MDHL model. Since our bivariate mixture with
two latent variables imposes restrictions on the unconditional joint moments of the observ-
ables as a function of model parameters, it is possible to form overidentifying restrictions on
the data. Optimization methods can then be used to estimate the coeﬃcients and test the
global validity of the model simultaneously.
Let Xt = (Rt,Vt) be the vector of return and volume observations prevailing at day t




v,m2I,p) be the 6 × 1 vector of the MDHL model
parameters. The ﬁrst four coeﬃcients are related to the observables and correspond to the
mean and variance parameters of equations (3.33)-(3.34), m2I is the second moment of the
latent variable It and p is the Bernoulli distribution parameter which drives the distribution
of the latent variable Lt.
If Xt is generated by the MDHL model, there is some true set of parameters θ0 for which:
E[ht(Xt,θ0)] = 0, (4.1)
where ht is a column vector of H unconditional moment conditions implied by our model.
Since we do not observe the true expectation of ht in practice, we deﬁne a vector gT(θ)
containing the sample averages corresponding to the elements of ht. For large T, if Xt is






ht(Xt,θ0) −→ 0, when T → ∞. (4.2)
In order to derive the moment restrictions implied by the MDHL model, we focus on the









































0ﬁrst four moments of the return and volume time series and on some of their corresponding
cross-moments such as the covariances between returns and either volume or squared volume.
In the previous section we assumed that, conditional on It, Lt is drawn from a binomial
distribution with parameters It and p. It follows that the unconditional moments of Lt
are functions of p and the unconditional moments of It. In addition, we need to choose a
distribution function for the latent variable It. TP assume a lognormal distribution for the
mixing variable It in order to ensure its positiveness. Lognormality has also been suggested
by several authors, such as ? as well as Foster and Viswanathan (1993). Richardson and
Smith (1994) tested several distribution functions for the information inﬂow and conclude
that the data reject the lognormal distribution less frequently than the other distribution
candidates, such as inverted gamma and Poisson distributions. These results motivate us to
retain a lognormal distribution for It.
As discussed by TP, the mathematical formulations of the latent factor models, such as
the MDHL model, are invariant with respect to scalar transformations of the unobserved
variables. It follows that, if a is any positive constant such as I∗
















t | It,Lt), (4.4)
is empirically the same as the MDHL model given in (3.33)-(3.34). By setting E[I∗
t ] = 1, we













1I. Henceforth, we will
consider only these transformed parameters. However, for notation simplicity, we omit the
"∗" symbol.















































m4I + 4(1 + m2I)
3 + 3 − (1 + m2I)
6 − 6(1 + m2I) = 0 (4.5)
where miI,(i = 2,3,4) is the ith centered moment for the mixing variable It.
Given the scalar transformations of the parameters depending on It, as well as the dis-
tribution assumptions for It (It ∼ LogN(1,m2I)) and Lt (Lt | It ∼ B(It,p)), the sample


























(Vt − E(Vt)) (1)
(Rt − E(Rt))2 (2)
(Vt − E(Vt))2 (3)
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t − E(R2




t − E(V 2
t )) (5)
(Vt − E(Vt))3 (6)
(Rt − E(Rt))4 (7)
(Vt − E(Vt))4 (8)






















The functional forms of the sample moments (1)-(9) are given in Appendix C.2. We obtain
a system of nine equations and only six parameters to be estimated which yields three
overidentifying restriction to test22.
4.2.2 Test results
We apply the GMM procedure described in the previous paragraph to the 93 stocks of our
sample using the entire data history. To restrict the Bernoulli parameter p to evolve between
22When working with an overidentiﬁed system, the GMM chooses ˆ θT as the value of θ that minimizes the
quadratic form of gT(θ) which requires the selection of a weighting matrix. For this purpose, we use the









































00 and 1, we use a logistic-transform with x being the unconstrained parameter. Tables 2
and 3 of Appendix D report the estimation results. The test statistics of Hansen (1982)
allowing to assess the global validity of the MDHL model are given in column 9. With three
overidentifying restrictions, they are asymptotically distributed as a χ2
3. For 83% of the
stocks, the test statistic values do not exceed their critical value of 7,82. Consequently, we
can not reject the MDHL model at the 95% level of signiﬁcance.
Columns 2 to 5 in Tables 2 and 3 provide parameter estimates for returns and volume
distributions, while columns 6 to 8 report estimated parameters related to the latent variables
It and Lt distributions. Since we set E(It) = 1, the estimated µat
v can be interpreted as the
time-series-average of the impact of information inﬂow on the daily traded volume. On the
other hand, pµla
v can be interpreted as the time-series-average of the impact of liquidity
shocks on the daily traded volume. In particular, pµla
v represents a stock-speciﬁc measure for
liquidity which is determined by both the amplitude of trade asynchronization, as measured
by µla
v , and its probability of occurrence p. The higher the trade asynchronization for a given
stock the higher its frequency and the liquidity-arbitrage-based traded volume. This in turn
results in a higher volume and thus a higher pµla
v .
Since our model implies that information moves the market from one equilibrium to
the next and liquidity shocks appear within some of these equilibria, we should expect to
observe a statistically signiﬁcant µla
v parameter only for stocks having also a signiﬁcant µat
v .
The results reported in Appendix D conﬁrm our intuitions. The 43 stocks for which we
obtain signiﬁcant µla
v have also a µat
v parameter statistically diﬀerent from zero. Note that,
for these stocks, we also obtain statistically signiﬁcant x parameters. Reported are in column
9 of Tables 2 and 3 the relative values of the average liquidity volume as measured by pµla
v
divided by the sum of µat
v and23 pµla
v , henceforth relative pµla
v . At this stage of the analysis,
two additional remarks can be made:
(i) A signiﬁcantly positive pµla
v suggests that the stock faces time-average intraday liquidity












































0frictions. This motivates the liquidity arbitragers to enter the market and thus increase
the average traded volume. Since we do not observe liquidity shocks, we can infer their
occurrence from liquidity arbitrage trading which directly impacts the volume. Our model
helps identify the intraday impact of this type of market participants on the traded volume
using daily data: 39 out of the 43 stocks with a signiﬁcantly positive pµla
v are concerned by
signiﬁcant liquidity problems24.
(ii) If pµla
v is not signiﬁcant, our model comes down to that of Tauchen and Pitts (1983)
which assumes that the total traded volume is a proxy of the information ﬂow.
4.3 The MDHL-based liquidity measure
We use a structural model to separate the respective impacts of the two latent variables It
and Lt on the average-raw-traded volume of individual stocks. The model is particularly
attractive in practice since it provides a static, stock-speciﬁc liquidity measure pµla
v which
helps identify the presence of intraday liquidity frictions using daily data. Based on the µat
v ,
µla
v and p parameters, we can distinguish stocks concerned by liquidity frictions for a given
period (on average) from liquid equities whose average daily traded volume is driven only
by information inﬂow. In addition, using the relative pµla
v reported in column 9 of Tables
2 and 3, stocks facing liquidity frictions can be ranked according to their respective degree
of illiquidity, which is determined for any given stock by (i) the amplitude of trade asyn-
chronization and (ii) its probability of occurrence. Thus, estimating µla
v and p separately
provides additional insights concerning the liquidity proﬁle of a given stock. The liquidity-
based average volume for a particular period can be explained by frequent but small liquidity
accidents, rare but large liquidity accidents, or simultaneously frequent and large liquidity
accidents. For example, HAMMERSON PLC (stock 32), SEGRO PLC (stock 77), SCOT-
TISH & SOUTHERN ENERGY (stock 81) and XSTRATA PLC (stock 92), exhibiting the
24The 4 remaining stocks, CADBURY PLC (stock 18), MAN GROUP PLC (stock 27), SABMILLER PLC
(stock 72) and UNILEVER PLC (stock 85), have negligible relative pµla
v characterized by both p and µla
v









































04 highest relative pµla
v of our sample, are characterized by both important µla
v parameters
(being 2 to 3 times higher than the corresponding µat
v ) and important probabilities of trade
asynchronization p whose values fall in the sample’s highest decile. On the other hand, some
other equity assets, such as LONMIN PLC (stock 50) and MITCHELLS & BUTLERS PLC
(stock 51) face liquidity shocks characterized by much higher amplitude of trade asynchro-
nization than in the former case (of an order of 7 to 9 times higher then the corresponding
µat
v ) yet much lower p values.
Previous literature relates stock liquidity to total traded volume and suggests that illiquid
equity assets have low traded volume or turnover25. Thus, the total traded volume appears
to be a good proxy for liquidity. Moreover, using market capitalization as a proxy for stock
liquidity is a common practice in ﬁnancial markets where small stocks are assumed to face
more liquidity problems than blue chip stocks. We now confront these 2 measures to the
MDHL-based liquidity indicator pµla
v .
Figures 4 and 5 focus on the 39 stocks of our sample presenting a signiﬁcantly positive
relative pµla
v and show the relative liquidity volume against the average raw daily volume26
and the average market capitalization27 over the estimation period, respectively. The ﬁrst
graph points out that there is no systematic relation between relative pµla
v and total traded
volume. For example, the highest time-average-raw-volume stock, XSTRATA PLC (stock
92), presents a greater relative pµla
v than some others with lower MDHL-based liquidity
measure, such as HSBC HOLDINGS (stock 34) and BP PLC (stock 15). More generally,
within the groups of large traded volume and low traded volume stocks, there is an impor-
tant dispersion of the illiquidity level. As a result, the total traded volume does not help
discriminate stocks facing liquidity shocks according to their degree of illiquidity.
25See Datar et al. (1998), and Chordia et al. (2000) among others.
26The traded volume is measured by the turnover.


















































































Figure 4: Relative liquidity volume versus average daily traded volume.











































Figure 5: Relative liquidity volume versus average market cap measured by the ﬂoat.
These results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Borgy et al. (2010) regarding the lack of the traded
volume and the number of transactions to correctly measure market illiquidity. For exam-
ple, a higher number of transactions may be due to a higher liquidity risk which induces
market participants to split their trades, as well as to an increasing market liquidity due









































0framework, an increasing total traded volume for a given stock may be explained by a rise in
information-based trading, or by an increase in liquidity trading activity due to the interven-
tion of liquidity arbitragers who trade in response to liquidity frictions. This suggests that
decomposing the total traded volume into two components due to information and liquidity
shocks provides more precise indications on market liquidity.
Figure 5 shows that the biggest companies among the 39 stocks are also the most liq-
uid ones. For large market capitalizations, there is indeed quite a strong negative relation
between ﬁrm size and illiquidity level. However, within the group of small capitalizations,
there is an important dispersion of pµla
v values. For example, some of the most illiquid ﬁrms,
such as HAMMERSON PLC (stock 32), SEGRO PLC (stock 77), but also some of the less
illiquid ones, such as LONMIN PLC (stock 50), belong to the lowest size deciles. These
ﬁndings suggest that the market size is not a good proxy for liquidity shocks. In particular,
considering small ﬁrms to be illiquid may be misleading since market size fails to discriminate
small companies according to their illiquidity level.
Assessing the stock liquidity level through simultaneously total traded volume and mar-
ket capitalization ends up to being quite disconcerting. Illustrating this point, XSTRATA
PLC (stock 92) is considered as the less illiquid among the 39 ﬁrms according to the total
traded volume criterion, but as one of the most illiquid ones as reported by the market
capitalization indicator. Conversely, HSBS HOLDINGS (stock 34) and BP PLC (stock 15)
seem to be highly illiquid when focusing on the total traded volume, while their (large) size
ranks them among the less illiquid of the 39 equity assest considered here. These results
highlight the relevance of such a structural liquidity measure as the pµla
v , in order to obtain
a better understanding of the market liquidity for a given stock. The pµla
v indicator provides
additional insights on a ﬁrm’s liquidity while reconciliating and explaining the results ob-
tained using the total traded volume and the market capitalization criteria. In particular,
for XSTRATA PLC (stock 92), HSBS HOLDINGS (stock 34) and BP PLC (stock 15), the









































0expense of the total traded volume indicator.
4.4 Robustness checks
4.4.1 Global validity of MDHL relative to the standard MDH
We also estimate the standard MDH model using Richardson and Smith (1994) procedure28.
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix E. The standard MDH model
is accepted by the data for 89% of stocks versus 83% for the MDHL model. The slight
under-performance of the MDHL model in terms of global validity can be explained by its
higher degree of estimation complexity. Richardson and Smith (1994) estimate unbounded
parameters while we restrict the values of the p to evolve between 0 and 1. On the other
hand, Richardson and Smith (1994) modify the TP’s price change equation by artiﬁcially
introducing a mean parameter µp which allows them to obtain much simpler moment condi-
tions than in the absence of µp. This is not the case in our framework; our model is directly
derived from the standard MDH of TP without a mean parameter in the price variation
equation.
The MDHL model has a two-dimensional structure, allowing separating information from
liquidity shock impacts on the total traded volume. While providing a deeper comprehension
of how the daily traded volume is built up, it enables us to obtain a similar level of global
validity compared to the standard MDH model, which stands as its one-dimensional coun-
terpart. When comparing the mean volume parameters obtained by the two models, we ﬁnd
that µv is approximately equal to the sum of µat
v and pµla
v . For example, for ASSOCIATED
BRITISH FOODS PLC (stock 2), we have µv = 0,00621 and (µat
v + pµla
v ) = 0,00625; for
BARCLAYS PLC (stock 8), we obtain µv = 0,00592 and (µat
v + pµla
v ) = 0,00589. These
results are intuitive and show that the MDHL model succeeds in decomposing the average
28To estimate the standard MDH model we use the implied unconditional means, variances, skewness, and
corresponding cross-moments of the observable variables, Rt and Vt. With 9 moment conditions and only
6 parameters to be estimated, there are 3 overidentifying restrictions to be tested. For more details, see









































0traded volume into information-based and liquidity-based components.
4.4.2 Parameter stability
As discussed previously, pµla
v is, by construction, a static liquidity measure which quantiﬁes,
on average over a given test period, the daily volume driven by liquidity frictions. To assess
its dynamics over time, we perform subperiod analysis for a set of 10 stocks of our sample,
8 of them representing diﬀerent illiquidity levels as measured by relative pµla
v , the other 2
being deemed perfectly liquid. For these 10 candidates, we split the data history into two
subperiods of 318 observations extending from 4 January 2005 to 4 April 2006 and from
5 April 2006 to 10 July 2007, respectively. Our goal is to assess the stability of the stock
liquidity proﬁle over the 2 time intervals. In the presence of time-varying pµla
v , we should
observe an increase of the illiquidity level in the second subperiod since stock markets were
impacted in 2007 by signiﬁcant liquidity shocks in connection with the subprime crisis.
Table 6 in Appendix F gives the MDHL-estimated parameters for both subperiods as
well as the overall time interval. Global validity of the MDHL model is conﬁrmed for both
subperiods; the χ2
3 values do not exceed their critical value of 7,82. This suggests that, for the
selected stocks, the MDHL model is a plausible explanation of the bivariate distribution of
stock returns and traded volume; its global validity is not sample-dependent. Moreover, the
information-based volume parameter µat
v estimated using the overall time period for a given
stock is included in the interval delimited by the µat
v values obtained using the two distinct
subperiods. In particular, the overall-period-information-based measure is approximately
equal to the mean of the two subperiod ones. The slight deviations may be due to the
diﬀerent lengths of the data history − and thus diﬀerent amplitudes of the standard errors.
The same is true for the MDHL liquidity measure29.
The subperiod analysis provides additional insights concerning the stability of the liq-
29In this case the diﬀerences between the full period pµla
v and the mean between the two subperiod pµla
v
are larger than in the former case since our liquidity measure simultaneously depends on two estimated











































v proposed in this paper. As for the 2 liquid stocks considered here,
CAPITA GROUP PLC (stock 22) remains liquid over time, while NATIONAL GRID PLC
(stock 54) is aﬀected by signiﬁcant liquidity shocks during the second time interval. In this
case, working with the entire sample history hides the presence of liquidity frictions related
to a particular subperiod. Within the group of ﬁrms impacted by liquidity shocks, we can
distinguish two types of stocks: those having constant pµla
v over time, such as DIAGEO
PLC (stock 24) and ICAP PLC (stock 35), and those exhibiting substantial variations in
the liquidity measure, as for KELLN SOLAR (stock 44) and SEGRO PLC (stock 77). In
the latter case, variations in the absolute illiquidity level are due to signiﬁcant changes in
the amplitude of liquidity-based volume as well as to the probability of order imbalance,
reﬂecting a time-varying liquidity proﬁle. KELLN SOLAR (stock 44) illustrates this point
with large but infrequent liquidity shocks for subperiod 1 (µla
v = 0,0176, p = 0,008) and
lower but more probable liquidity frictions for subperiod 2 (µla
v = 0,0126, p = 0,038). On
the other hand, the time variation of the SEGRO PLC (stock 77) liquidity proﬁle can be
explained by an substantial growth of the order imbalance frequency which varies from 0,02
in the ﬁrst time interval to 0,11 in the second one.
Generally speaking, subperiod 2 is characterized by an increasing stock illiquidity level as
compared to the ﬁrst time interval. Even some of the ﬁrms with pµla
v = 0 during subperiod 1,
such as SAGE GROUP PLC (stock 76), REED ELSEVIER PLC (stock 65) and NATIONAL
GRID PLC (stock 54), turn out to face signiﬁcant liquidity frictions during the second time
interval. Such results are intuitive and reﬂect important liquidity shocks which aﬀected
ﬁnancial markets during the summer of 2007. Our model enriches the analysis by providing
a more acute explanation of the impact of liquidity shocks on trading volume. It enables
us to characterize illiquid ﬁrms according to the amplitude of the liquidity shocks and its
probability of occurrence, allowing traders to adapt their strategies accordingly.
To summarize these results, the global validity of the MDHL model seems to be time-










































v can be directly applied to assets whose liquidity-based volume does
not vary signiﬁcatively over time. In this case, we can get a better understanding of ﬁrm
liquidity and decompose the total traded volume into information-based and liquidity-based
components. On the other hand, the subperiod analysis highlights an important drawback
of our liquidity measure related to its failure to capture the time-dynamics of the stock
illiquidity proﬁle. This remark leads to a natural extension of our framework consisting in
building a time-varying liquidity measure. This point will be discussed in the next section.
5 Concluding remarks
In this article, we ﬁrst distinguish between two trading strategies, information-based and
liquidity-based trading. We suggest that their respective impacts on returns and traded
volume should be modeled diﬀerently. The former is incorporated into the daily price changes
and the traded volume. The latter impacts the intraday price variations and volumes but
do not aﬀect the daily price changes, while increasing the daily traded volume. Second, we
focus on the contemporaneous volatility-volume relationship and blend the microstructure
setting of Grossman and Miller (1988) into the Tauchen and Pitts (1983) framework in order
to develop an modiﬁed MDH model with two latent factors related to information arrivals
and liquidity frictions. Our model provides a theoretical explanation of how the liquidity
accidents increase the daily traded volume, in the presence of arbitrage participants. Third,
the MDHL model gives a better comprehension of how the daily traded volume is built
up; We show how to exploit the volatility-volume relation in order to separate information
from liquidity impacts on the observed daily volume. In other words, the increase of volume
due to liquidity arbitragers helps inferring the presence of liquidity frictions corresponding
to order imbalances driven by asynchronization of order ﬂows among active participants.
In particular, our model exploits the time-series dimension of individual assets to provide









































0helps distinguish, for a given period, liquid (presenting not signiﬁcant pµla
v ) from less liquid
stocks (presenting signiﬁcant pµla
v ). In addition, estimating p and µla
v separately provides a
better comprehension of the stock liquidity proﬁle determined by the amplitude of the order
imbalances and the probability of their occurrence. This may be useful in order to build
stock-picking strategies at a high trading frequency.
Our MDHL liquidity-based indicator is similar to that of Getmansky et al. (2004) who
provide a static measure of the illiquidity aﬀecting hedge fund returns. The authors sys-
tematically analyze various sources of the observed autocorrelation in hedge fund returns,
such as time-varying expected returns, time-varying leverage, fee structures of hedge funds,
as well as illiquidity and smoothed returns. They conclude that illiquid investments which
drive "marking to model" returns and performance smoothing are the most plausible cause of
the time-persistence of hedge fund returns. It follows that, serial correlation of fund returns
may be a good proxy for illiquidity. Time-series of reported hedge fund returns can then be
used to estimate the serial correlation of individual funds, which helps separate liquid from
illiquid hedge funds for a given period.
Finally, our liquidity indicator presents two main limitations. First, it is a static indicator
and as such it fails to capture the time-varying dynamics of liquidity frictions. The second
limitation concerns the impossibility to build a common (market-wide) liquidity factor using
stock-speciﬁc pµla
v parameters. Several recent studies are based on the commonality and time-
varying properties of liquidity risk. Patton and Li (2009) extend Getmansky et al. (2004)
analysis by allowing for serial correlation parameters to vary over time. They propose a
model for time-varying hedge fund liquidity, building on the connection between liquidity
and autocorrelation. In their empirical application over 600 individual hedge funds, they
ﬁnd strong evidence of time-varying liquidity for all hedge fund styles. They also provide
a dynamic time-dependent proxy of liquidity for individual hedge funds. Nagel (2009) uses
the proﬁtability of contrarian strategies as a proxy for returns which compensate liquidity









































0extracts a time-varying, market-wide liquidity indicator. The advantage of such an indicator
is that it provides information on how market liquidity evolves over time and what determines
its evolution. For example, Nagel (2009) ﬁnds that the liquidity indicator co-moves closely
with the level of the VIX.
Therefore, it would be interesting to expand our stock-speciﬁc approach to ﬁrst extract
time-varying latent liquidity factors for individual stocks. For this purpose, the MDHL
model developed in this paper can be extended to allow for serial dependence in Lt. Several
studies show that liquidity shocks are not isolated events in time but rather seem to be
time-persistent30. This suggests that serial correlation in Lt may explain the persistence of
the traded volume. Signal extraction methods can then be used to ﬁlter the latent variable
Lt for individual assets and thus to provide a time-varying, stock-speciﬁc liquidity indicator.
Finally, factor decomposition analysis can be applied to the panel of individual liquidity
indicators in order to build market-wide liquidity factors and thus to separate, for a given
stock, common from speciﬁc liquidity components. This point is out of the scope of this
paper and is part of current research.
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A The MDH model of Tauchen and Pitts (1983)
The economy of Tauchen and Pitts (1983), henceforth TP, comprises a single risky asset
and J active participants who trade in response to information arrival to the market. Each
trading day consists of a series of intraday sucessive equilibria initiated by information shocks.
The number of intraday equilibria It is random which drives the variability of price changes
and traded volume.
Let Qij be the quantity that the trader j (j = 1,...,J) is willing to trade at the ith
intra-day equilibrium (i = 1,...,It). Qij is then given by the linear relation:
Qij = a[P
∗
ij − Pi], (j = 1,2,...,J), (A.1)
where a > 0 is a constant, P ∗
ij is the reservation price of trader j at the intra-day equilibrium
i and Pi is the current market price31. The reservation price heterogeneity among traders
comes from diﬀerent expectation about the future liquidation value ˜ P, as well as diﬀerent
needs to transfer the risk through the market. The ith peace of information hitting the
market will result in a price increment ∆Pi and a corresponding traded volume Vi.
In particular, the market clearing condition
 J










31Note that transaction costs are not considered in equation (A.1); the model assumes that the traders































































ij − ∆Pi|, (A.4)
where ∆P ∗
ij is the increment of the jth trader reservation price.
TP make some additional assumptions concerning the distribution of trader’s reservation
price increments in order to obtain testable implications of the model. They assume a
variance-component model:
∆P ∗
ij = φi + ψij, (A.5)
with φi ∼ N(0,σ2
φ), ψij ∼ N(0,σ2
ψ),
where φ and ψ are mutually independent both across traders and through time. Note that, φi
is common to all traders and represents common variations of equilibrium price in response
to new information. ψij is supposed to be the trader-speciﬁc component of price increment
related to trader subjectif interpretation of new information. The higher the absolute value
of φi relative to ψij, the higher the signal-to-noise ratio concerning information inﬂow. Using
equations (A.3)-(A.5), ∆Pi and Vi can be written as:






| ψij − ¯ ψi |, (A.7)













































0that: (i) Intraday price change ∆Pi is normally distributed: ∆Pi ∼ N(µp,σ2
p); (ii) Intraday
traded volume Vi is approximately normally distributed for large J: Vi ∼ N(µv,σ2
v); (iii)
∆Pi and Vi are stochastically independent and their ﬁrst two moments are32:
µp ≡ E[∆Pi] = 0,
σ
2






































Daily price change ∆Pt and trading volume Vt are obtained by summing their within-day










Vi, Vi ∼ N(µv,σ
2
v). (A.10)
Both ∆Pt and Vt are mixtures of independent normals with the same mixing variable It.




Vt = µvIt + σv
 
ItZ2t, (A.11)
where Z1t and Z2t are i.i.d. standard normal variables and mutually independent. At the
end of the day t, all the incoming information is incorporated into the price change ∆Pt and
traded volume Vt.









































0Using a lognormal distribution for It and the maximum likelihood method, TP show that
the standard MDH model captures the positive relationship between price change variance
and volume on the 90-day T-bills futures market. Richardson and Smith (1994) extend TP
work by introducing a mean parameter for daily price change and use GMM tests to validate
the model. In this paper, we use Richardson and Smith (1994) version when estimating the
standard MDH model for robustness checks (see section 4).
B The Grossman and Miller (1988) model
Grossman and Miller (1988), henceforth GM, consider a simple world with only three dates.
Date 1 and date 2 are trading dates, while date 3 is used only as a terminal condition. There
are only two assets in the GM economy: (i) a risky asset whose liquidation value at date 3
is ˜ P3 and (ii) a risk-free asset whose return is normalized to zero. GM consider two types of
traders, the outside customers who trade in response to information inﬂow, and the market
makers who trade in response to liquidity shocks. In our framework, the outside customers
are called active traders as in TP. Moreover, the market makers of GM correspond exactly
to our liquidity arbitragers: they provide liquidity when it is needed in order to cash the
liquidity premium.
Information concerning ˜ P3 is assumed to arrive before trade at period 1 and before trade
at period 2. Let J be the number of all the potential active traders in the market. The
active trader j (j = 1,...,J) at time 1 has an endowment of size zj in the security which is
unsuitable given the trade-oﬀ between his risk preferences and information at that date. At
period 1, some liquidity frictions arise because of asynchronization of time of trade among



















































is the number of active traders being present in the market at date 1. If all the
active participants were present in the market at date 1, the order imbalance would vanish
and the net trading demand would be zero:
J  
j=1
zj = 0. (B.2)
In the GM world, a liquidity event occurs at date 1 which motivates the liquidity arbi-
tragers to enter the market in order to provide immediacy and thus compensate for the
order disproportion; they liquidate their positions at date 2 as other active traders arrive
with the opposite order imbalance. At date 2, the remaining active participants arrive with
the opposite aggregated endowment shock which, by deﬁnition, cancels out the time-1-order
imbalance. This assumption is crucial to discerning the advantages for the active traders
arriving at date 1 to postpone their trades to date 2.
Let Bs be the cash-position of the active trader j at date s (s = 1,2) and ¯ Qs be the
quantity of the risky asset he holds after trading at time s:
¯ Qs = Qs + zj, (B.3)
where Qs is trader’s excess demand. Using exponential preferences:
U(W3) = −e
−αW3, (B.4)
and backward induction, we can obtain the optimal excess demand at period s (s = 1,2) by
maximizing the expected utility of terminal wealth W3:
EsU(W3) = Es(−e
−αW3), (B.5)










































W3 = B2 + ¯ Q3 ˜ P3, (B.6)
˜ P2 ¯ Q2 + B2 = W2 = B1 + ˜ P2 ¯ Q1, (B.7)
˜ P1 ¯ Q1 + B1 = W1 = ˜ P1zj + W0, (B.8)
where W0 represents other wealth possessed by the active participant before trade at date 1.
In particular, date-2-participants of the GM world consist of: (i) the active traders who
arrived in the market at date 1; (ii) the active traders arriving at date 2 with opposite order
imbalance, as well as (iii) the liquidity arbitragers willing to liquidate the positions taken at
date 1. At date 2, the maximization program for active trader j belonging to the ﬁrst group
can be written as:
max
Q2
E2U(W2 − P2zj + ( ˜ P3 − P2)Q2 + ˜ P3zj), (B.9)
where W3 = W2 −P2zj +( ˜ P3 −P2)Q2 + ˜ P3zj is deduced by equations (B.3) and (B.6)-(B.8).





E2 ˜ P3 − P2
αV ar2 ˜ P3
− zj, (B.10)
where mean and variance operators reﬂect the information available at date 2. Assuming that
active traders diﬀer only concerning zj and from linearity between Qat
2 and zj, Qat
2 corresponds





E2 ˜ P3 − P2
αV ar2 ˜ P3
− z. (B.11)









































02 with opposite order imbalance is given by:
E2 ˜ P3 − P2
αV ar2 ˜ P3
+ z. (B.12)
Assuming that there are M liquidity arbitragers in the market having the same prefer-
ences as the active traders except that for them the endowment shock is zero, their total




E2 ˜ P3 − P2
αV ar2 ˜ P3
, (B.13)
where Qla
2 is the optimal excess demand per liquidity arbitrager.
Given the excess demand functions (B.11), (B.12) and (B.13), the market clearing con-
dition at date 2 can be written as:
E2 ˜ P3 − P2
αV ar2 ˜ P3
− z +
E2 ˜ P3 − P2
αV ar2 ˜ P3
+ z + M
E2 ˜ P3 − P2
αV ar2 ˜ P3
= 0, (B.14)
which implies that:
P2 = E2 ˜ P3. (B.15)
It follows that at the equilibrium we get:
Q
at
2 = −z, (B.16)
Q
la
2 = 0. (B.17)
At date 1, the active participants who are willing to trade maximize the expected utility
depending on date-1 information. Note that the risk at date 1 comes from the fact that new









































0(B.6)-(B.8), (B.15) and (B.16), we get:
max
Q1
E1U(W0 + Q1(E2 ˜ P3 − P1) + zE2 ˜ P3), (B.18)
which yields the optimal aggregated excess demand Qat




E1 ˜ P3 − P1
αV ar1(E2 ˜ P3)
− z, (B.19)
where E1E2 ˜ P3 = E1 ˜ P3, as implied by the law of iterated expectations.
Liquidity arbitragers, who continually observe the market, provide immediacy at date
1 by taking trading positions that they hold until date 2. In the same way as for active




E1 ˜ P3 − P1
αV ar1(E2 ˜ P3)
. (B.20)
The market clearing condition at period 1 gives:
E1 ˜ P3 − P1
αV ar1(E2 ˜ P3)
− z + M
E1 ˜ P3 − P1
αV ar1(E2 ˜ P3)
= 0, (B.21)
which yields the equilibrium price at time 1, P1:
P1 = E1 ˜ P3 −
zαV ar1(E2 ˜ P3)
1 + M
. (B.22)























































Note that P1 depends on the magnitude and the sign of the order imbalance. When z = 0,
P1 equals the price revealing the information E1 ˜ P3. For z  = 0, the equilibrium price depends
on the number of liquidity providers present in the market at date 1. The higher the number
of liquidity arbitragers, the lower the order imbalance impact on the equilibrium price P1.
Let ˜ R2 = ˜ P2/P1 − 1 be the excess return earned by arbitragers at date 2. From (B.22) it
follows that:
E1 ˜ R2 =
P1z
1 + M
αV ar1( ˜ R2). (B.25)
Note that, if either z → 0 or M → ∞, E1 ˜ R2 = 0. This means that the combined eﬀect of the
order asynchronization and the ﬁnite number of liquidity arbitragers results in departures of
E1 ˜ R2 from zero.
Finally, GM assume that liquidity arbitragers face an exogenous cost of maintaining a
market presence − denoted by c − and that the order imbalance z is not known when this
cost is paid out. Supposing that z behaves as a centered normally distributed variable which
is independent from information shocks, the expected utility for a given liquidity arbitrager
is33:
EU(W3) = EU(W0 − c + ( ˜ P2 − P1)Q
la
1 ). (B.26)
It follows that, arbitragers will be motivated to enter the market until the transaction costs










































0oﬀset the expected proﬁts between dates 1 and 2:
EU(W0 − c + ( ˜ P2 − P1)Q
la
1 ) = EU(W0). (B.27)
Using (B.20) and exponential utility for (B.27), it can be shown that M is a decreasing
function of c34. When c > 0 the number of arbitragers is ﬁnite. This result is critical to
understanding the beneﬁts, for liquidity arbitragers, of providing immediacy at date 1.
Generally speaking, the GM framework focuses on the consequences of an order imbalance
on the intraday patterns of price change and transaction volume. At this stage, the model
shows that in the presence of liquidity frictions and exogenous transaction costs:
(i) The traded volume at date 1 is lower than it would have been if there were no order
imbalance35.
(ii) The transaction price at date 1 deviates from its revealing information level (P1  = E1 ˜ P3).
However, from the assumptions that the order imbalance sums to zero across periods 1
and 2, and that the liquidity arbitragers oﬀset their positions at date 2, it follows that the
traded volume across dates 1 and 2 is higher than it would have been in the absence of
liquidity frictions if the condition M ≥ 1 is veriﬁed36. This reasoning motivates us to extend
the GM framework in order to model the impact of liquidity frictions on total price changes
and total traded volume.
34For a detailed demonstration see Grossman and Miller (1988).
35From (B.23) it follows that a ﬁnite M implies |Qat
1 | < |z|.
36In other words, the order imbalance faced by outside customers who exchange at date 1 is oﬀset thanks










































0C The GMM estimations
C.1 The GMM procedure of Hansen (1982) with Newey and West
(1987) weighting matrix
Let Xt = (Rt,Vt) be the vector of return and volume observations prevailing at day t





v,m2I,p). If Xt is generated by the MDHL model, there is some true set of
parameters θ0 for which:
E[ht(Xt,θ0)] = 0, (C.1)
where ht is a column vector of Nh unconditional moment conditions implied by our model.
Since we do not observe the true expectation of ht, we deﬁne a vector gT(θ) containing the
sample averages corresponding to the elements of ht. We index the vector of sample moments
by T to indicate its dependence on the sample size. For large T, if Xt is generated by the






ht(Xt,θ0) −→ 0, when T → ∞. (C.2)
In this paper, we work with an overidentiﬁed system, i.e., Nh > Np, which allows us to
estimate θ and test the global validity of the MDHL model simultaneously. In this case, the











































0where WT is an (Nh x Nh) symmetric-positive-deﬁnite-weighting matrix. Since the problem
is nonlinear, this minimization is performed numerically. The ﬁrst order condition is:
DT(ˆ θT)
′WTgT(ˆ θT) = 0, (C.4)
where DT(ˆ θ) is the sample approximation of the true partial derivative matrix and is given
by:
DT(ˆ θT) = ∂gT(ˆ θT)/∂ˆ θ
′
T. (C.5)
The asymptotic distribution of the coeﬃcient estimate is:
√
T(ˆ θT − θ) ∼
asy N(0,V ), (C.6)
where V is its asymptotic covariance matrix. An important point of the GMM analysis is to
pick a weighting matrix WT that minimizes V and hence deliver an asymptotically eﬃcient
estimator. In this article, we use the Newey and West (1987) methodology to estimate the
optimal weighting matrix denoted by ST. The Newey-West estimator accounts for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity among the terms of the matrix ht and is given by:












where q is the number of autocovariances one wishes to include in the computation and
Γj,T(ˆ θT) is the sample autocovariance matrix of ht as given by:















































0Finally, Hansen (1982) provides an overidentifying test statistic JT(ˆ θ) as follows:
JT(ˆ θ) ≡ TgT(ˆ θT)S
−1













































0C.2 Sample moment conditions for the MDHL model
The sample moment conditions in equation (4.6) are given as follows:








































































































































































































































0Equations (C.9) to (C.17) correspond to sample moment conditions (1) to (9) in (4.6). The
third and fourth central moments of It, m3I and m4I, are functions of its respective second
central moment m2I as given in equation (4.5). Note that, the central moments of Lt being
functions of p and the central moments of It, need not to be estimated. Finally, expectation


















































































































v m2I x p χ2
3 pµla
v (%)
1 0,007040** 0,014930* 0,000325** 0,00000000 0,173** 6,09** 0,002 2,78 0,47
2 0,006095** 0,024615** 0,000075** 0,00000000 0,327** 5,07** 0,006 2,95 2,46
3 0,006440** 0,050036** 0,000133** 0,00000000 0,487** 5,56** 0,004 3,23 2,89
4 0,016193** 0,035676 0,000377** 0,00000000 0,239** 6,89 0,001 7,81 -
5 0,004827** 0,007781 0,000127** 0,00000000 0,207** 4,02 0,018 3,68 -
6 0,005632** 0,000000 0,000110** 0,00000000 0,192** 4,11** 0,016 10,57 -
7 0,008299** 0,080822** 0,000180** 0,00000183 0,234** 6,09** 0,002 3,48 2,16
8 0,005706** 0,012923** 0,000137** 0,00000000 0,256** 4,27** 0,014 2,25 3,04
9 0,005497** 0,024871** 0,000105** 0,00000143 0,228** 4,95** 0,007 0,28 3,08
10 0,013645** 0,000005 0,000217** 0,00000313 0,271** 4,47** 0,011 15,93 -
11 0,010347** 0,030288** 0,000235** 0,00001010** 0,212** 4,00** 0,018 1,76 5,01
12 0,004579** 0,023868** 0,000202** 0,00000029 0,194** 7,89** 0,000 2,21 0,20
13 0,007147** 0,020656* 0,000160** 0,00000302 0,223** 4,38** 0,012 5,39 3,44
14 0,005174** 0,017671 0,000348** 0,00000000 0,211** 6,95* 0,001 7,43 -
15 0,005821** 0,019152** 0,000129** 0,00000000 0,157** 6,66** 0,001 3,24 0,42
16 0,011817** 0,067002** 0,000102** 0,00000000 0,332** 5,94** 0,003 8,30 -
17 0,005713** 0,000000 0,000121** 0,00000000 0,219** 8,36** 0,000 8,95 -
18 0,006297** 0,000000** 0,000102** 0,00000000 0,316** 15,41** 0,000 1,11 0,00
19 0,002458** 0,016717 0,000159** 0,00000000 0,322** 9,52** 0,000 4,56 -
20 0,006078** 0,009091** 0,000155** 0,00000000 0,242** 3,45** 0,031 1,97 4,40
21 0,009133** 0,021376 0,000146** 0,00000000 0,367** 4,52 0,011 6,23 -
22 0,006114 0,010793 0,000120** 0,00000000 0,258** 2,87 0,054 3,83 -
23 0,012486** 0,024083 0,000197** 0,00000000 0,364** 5,72 0,003 6,03 -
24 0,005370** 0,010659** 0,000063** 0,00000072 0,130** 3,85** 0,021 4,84 3,97
25 0,005098** 0,019464** 0,000119** 0,00000000 0,352** 4,73** 0,009 2,19 3,25
26 0,011474 0,014244 0,000141** 0,00000200 0,259 3,98 0,018 6,87 -
27 0,010676** 0,000000** 0,000246** 0,00000000 0,310** 15,53** 0,000 6,49 0,00
28 0,009013** 0,025501 0,000136** 0,00000000 0,347** 7,09 0,001 1,14 -
29 0,007865** 0,064835 0,000161** 0,00000000 0,486** 6,72** 0,001 2,70 -
30 0,004305 0,024855 0,000104 0,00000000 0,212 6,16 0,002 2,57 -
31 0,004146** 0,008845** 0,000101** 0,00000000 0,223** 4,00** 0,018 5,11 3,70
32 0,006383** 0,016126** 0,000179** 0,00000000 0,389** 2,85** 0,054 2,52 12,10
33 0,007054** 0,000000 0,000182** 0,00000000 0,442** 6,65** 0,001 2,92 -
34 0,003395** 0,006673** 0,000045** 0,00000067 0,120** 4,30** 0,013 7,55 2,56
35 0,007926** 0,056664** 0,000264** 0,00000945** 0,373** 5,24** 0,005 2,57 3,62
36 0,008806** 0,000000 0,000188** 0,00000000 0,320** 5,05** 0,006 12,55 -
37 0,009513** 0,000000 0,000147** 0,00000000 0,388** 7,18** 0,001 4,89 -
38 0,007438 0,026125 0,000122 0,00000415 0,219 4,72 0,009 3,81 -
39 0,005334** 0,019771** 0,000087** 0,00000000 0,237** 4,91** 0,007 4,89 2,63
40 0,008118** 0,006594 0,000192** 0,00000000 0,231** 2,96 0,049 13,08 -
41 0,011131** 0,000008** 0,000176** 0,00000000 0,315** 13,45** 0,000 7,95 -
42 0,009672 0,000000 0,000284** 0,00000000 0,332** 0,71** 0,328 6,00 -
43 0,006575** 0,000000 0,000146** 0,00000000 0,299** 9,94** 0,000 5,24 -
44 0,006229** 0,013975** 0,000120** 0,00000026 0,258** 3,84** 0,021 1,42 4,50
45 0,009898** 0,045066** 0,000162** 0,00000000 0,364** 4,87** 0,008 4,38 3,36
46 0,005729** 0,013238** 0,000139** 0,00000000 0,236** 4,28** 0,014 9,71 -
"*" and "**" indicate signiﬁcance at 90% and 95% levels of conﬁdence respectively.













































v m2I x p χ2
3 pµla
v (%)
47 0,005670** 0,039195** 0,000166** 0,00000029 0,299** 5,84** 0,003 0,30 1,96
48 0,005226** 0,008135 0,000119 0,00000124 0,270** 3,34 0,034 4,17 -
49 0,005967** 0,007442 0,000088 0,00000000 0,236** 3,12 0,042 4,70 -
50 0,012743** 0,097959** 0,000364** 0,00000000 0,337** 6,83** 0,001 3,81 0,82
51 0,011330** 0,072937** 0,000175** 0,00000000 0,480** 5,17** 0,006 2,92 3,52
52 0,008719** 0,000000 0,000124** 0,00000000 0,413** 4,01** 0,018 11,47 -
53 0,009159** 0,000000 0,000143** 0,00000000 0,468** 6,73** 0,001 8,04 -
54 0,004448** 0,007292 0,000095** 0,00000000 0,225** 3,19 0,040 4,86 -
55 0,008263** 0,004292 0,000131** 0,00000000 0,335** 1,75** 0,148 6,85 -
56 0,012171 0,003088 0,000128** 0,00000000 0,285** -0,28 0,570 9,09 -
57 0,007277** 0,042687** 0,000219** 0,00000070 0,401** 4,76** 0,008 1,30 4,74
58 0,006668** 0,011587 0,000187 0,00000000 0,218** 5,12 0,006 6,28 -
59 0,007672** 0,022692** 0,000256** 0,00000000 0,276** 5,43** 0,004 1,32 1,17
60 0,007863** 0,011006 0,000113** 0,00000000 0,269** 3,22 0,039 1,32 -
61 0,013258** 0,115264** 0,000175** 0,00000000 0,397** 5,79** 0,003 3,01 2,57
62 0,005446** 0,007457 0,000102 0,00000000 0,237** 4,38 0,012 7,01 -
63 0,004559** 0,030197** 0,000079** 0,00000000 0,141** 6,33** 0,002 9,95 -
64 0,001733** 0,005458** 0,000120** 0,00000000 0,244** 4,50** 0,011 3,31 3,36
65 0,006773** 0,018750** 0,000099 0,00000000 0,236** 5,20** 0,005 5,49 1,37
66 0,007098** 0,015138 0,000104** 0,00000000 0,335** 3,71** 0,024 4,43 -
67 0,005627 0,002416 0,000291** 0,00000000 0,142** 0,18 0,454 13,08 -
68 0,010011** 0,000003 0,000194** 0,00000165 0,254** 4,10** 0,016 2,10 -
69 0,008553** 0,014322 0,000177** 0,00000300 0,365** 8,82** 0,000 6,84 -
70 0,007432 0,024748 0,000164 0,00000000 0,143** 2,13 0,106 5,55 -
71 0,010442** 0,082827 0,000166** 0,00000000 0,343 6,78** 0,001 4,33 -
72 0,003652** 0,000001** 0,000157** 0,00000000 0,264** 7,96** 0,000 4,91 0,00
73 0,011692** 0,000001 0,000099** 0,00000000 0,544** 7,09** 0,001 4,04 -
74 0,007525** 0,043429** 0,000121 0,00000319 0,341** 5,61** 0,004 1,97 2,26
75 0,004046** 0,011888** 0,000218 0,00000000 0,307** 4,48** 0,011 1,63 3,13
76 0,007274** 0,037411** 0,000176 0,00000000 0,316** 6,39** 0,002 2,79 1,02
77 0,005522** 0,010229** 0,000152** 0,00000000 0,278** 2,60** 0,069 1,18 11,32
78 0,010804** 0,086171** 0,000193** 0,00000000 0,357** 6,41** 0,002 5,62 1,30
79 0,008293** 0,015345 0,000125** 0,00000000 0,285** 3,65* 0,025 3,68 -
80 0,008059** 0,036491** 0,000120** 0,00000000 0,256 6,37** 0,002 9,28 -
81 0,005287** 0,008437** 0,000108** 0,00000150 0,157** 2,68** 0,064 2,86 9,28
82 0,006074** 0,032030** 0,000182** 0,00000000 0,391** 4,97** 0,007 1,23 3,50
83 0,007775** 0,047332** 0,000119** 0,00000382 0,228** 5,95** 0,003 1,57 1,56
84 0,005163** 0,015509** 0,000091** 0,00000000 0,227** 5,96** 0,003 10,72 -
85 0,002348** 0,000005** 0,000094** 0,00000012 0,334** 14,48** 0,000 3,53 -
86 0,007168** 0,000002 0,000076** 0,00000083 0,201** 5,17** 0,006 2,19 -
87 0,018066** 0,013050 0,000513** 0,00000024 0,398** 1,97 0,123 7,75 -
88 0,004953** 0,000001** 0,000158** 0,00000000 0,228** 15,31** 0,000 9,16 -
89 0,063894 0,000030 0,000229** 0,00170417 0,347** 0,03** 0,493 20,42 -
90 0,008200** 0,032734** 0,000118** 0,00000048 0,206** 6,08** 0,002 1,65 0,09
91 0,008935** 0,000000 0,000137** 0,00000000 0,491** 7,40** 0,001 4,37 -
92 0,026785** 0,091897** 0,000438** 0,00014244** 0,144** 3,71** 0,024 2,36 7,56
93 0,009267** 0,046187** 0,000148** 0,00000000 0,412 4,66** 0,009 4,29 4,48
"*" and "**" indicate signiﬁcance at 90% and 95% levels of conﬁdence respectively.









































0E GMM estimation to test the standard MDH model









































0ID µp µv σ2
p σ2
v m2I m3I χ2
3
1 0,001576** 0,006974** 0,000341** 0,000000 0,164821** 0,076466** 4,43
2 0,000293 0,006213** 0,000082** 0,000007 0,537526** 0,771725** 4,04
3 0,000459 0,006450 0,000124 0,000003 0,615128 1,182884 9,18
4 0,002793** 0,016191** 0,000348** 0,000015 0,168119** 0,086267** 7,89
5 0,000593 0,004944** 0,000117** 0,000000 0,251352** 0,200954* 6,16
6 0,000648 0,005961** 0,000141** 0,000013** 0,623407** 0,916119** 1,89
7 0,000992** 0,008348** 0,000198** 0,000008 0,370009** 0,002626 2,39
8 0,000304 0,005915** 0,000136** 0,000000 0,335995** 0,431232** 2,61
9 0,001127** 0,005421** 0,000104** 0,000001 0,273959** 0,000798 4,37
10 0,000924* 0,014019** 0,000277** 0,000043** 0,506739** 0,544113** 0,85
11 0,001128** 0,010572** 0,000247** 0,000020** 0,209113** 0,504891** 4,44
12 0,001227** 0,004564** 0,000203** 0,000000 0,201264** 0,081835 2,78
13 0,000790* 0,007445** 0,000185** 0,000008* 0,236387** 0,547731** 3,55
14 0,002101** 0,005181** 0,000354** 0,000002 0,218648** 0,422673** 7,01
15 0,000725 0,005650 0,000122 0,000000 0,142258 0,053039 8,15
16 0,000204 0,012450** 0,000116** 0,000020 0,626882** 1,485704** 2,77
17 0,000516 0,005783** 0,000136** 0,000004** 0,369925** 0,364957** 3,74
18 0,000308 0,006282** 0,000104** 0,000002 0,383053** 0,491836** 1,15
19 -0,000209 0,002463** 0,000163** 0,000001 0,462963** 0,457725** 2,70
20 0,000640 0,006393** 0,000152** 0,000002 0,261004** 0,290055** 2,57
21 0,000582 0,009301** 0,000138** 0,000003 0,358138* 0,402375** 7,50
22 0,000851** 0,006702** 0,000119** 0,000006 0,268992** 0,385132 3,77
23 0,001061* 0,012701** 0,000209** 0,000028 0,574036** 0,816102 7,33
24 0,000560** 0,005666** 0,000067** 0,000000 0,254055** 0,296119** 1,31
25 -0,000340 0,005180** 0,000103** 0,000018* -0,213526 1,376168 4,97
26 0,000337 0,011794** 0,000171** 0,000062** 0,791139** 1,474336** 4,09
27 0,001466** 0,011202** 0,000271** 0,000015** 0,468301** 0,549208** 0,32
28 0,000753 0,008973** 0,000135** 0,000000 0,348388** 0,386472** 1,62
29 0,000160 0,008094** 0,000171** 0,000009 0,742010** 2,013111* 1,78
30 0,000213 0,004189** 0,000101** 0,000001 0,253895* 0,083571 4,78
31 0,000403 0,004333** 0,000110** 0,000001 0,338555** 0,400176** 1,81
32 0,000780 0,007169** 0,000187** 0,000011* 0,417406** 1,046547** 2,13
33 0,001097** 0,007001** 0,000178** 0,000018 0,360728* 10,347836 2,76
34 0,000092 0,003656** 0,000052** 0,000001 0,342485** 0,366668** 1,22
35 0,000013 0,008095 0,000271 0,000025 0,181488 0,632359 8,64
36 0,000806* 0,008736** 0,000207** 0,000013 0,505544** 0,636415* 5,52
37 0,000832* 0,009746** 0,000156** 0,000006 0,484987** 0,656846** 1,42
38 0,000898** 0,007722** 0,000143** 0,000002 0,315477** 0,334730** 3,73
39 0,000501 0,005558** 0,000091** 0,000001 0,392350** 0,757375** 3,18
40 0,001586** 0,008806** 0,000226** 0,000011** 0,448834** 0,447771** 0,68
41 -0,000652 0,010979 0,000175 0,000007 0,297440 0,761764 8,64
42 0,000931 0,009666** 0,000311** 0,000025 0,646960** 1,074764 1,94
43 0,000782* 0,006418** 0,000147** 0,000000 0,326012** 0,549908** 4,60
44 0,000667* 0,006578** 0,000119** 0,000005* 0,249873** 0,414520** 3,13
45 -0,001165** 0,009964** 0,000168** 0,000004 0,464029** 1,221262** 5,37
"*" and "**" indicate signiﬁcance at 90% and 95% levels of conﬁdence respectively.









































0ID µp µv σ2
p σ2
v m2I m3I χ2
3
46 0,000308 0,006052** 0,000170** 0,000002 0,369355** 0,421853** 3,22
47 0,000359 0,005642** 0,000158** 0,000006 0,218251** 1,077850 2,74
48 0,000282 0,005360** 0,000126** 0,000002 0,304649** 0,321132** 6,57
49 0,000184 0,006046 0,000083 0,000001 0,235209 0,195631 9,36
50 0,002334** 0,013313** 0,000435** 0,000039* 0,612897** 1,071623** 1,61
51 0,001268** 0,012308** 0,000185** 0,000009 0,896280** 3,419218** 2,99
52 0,001181** 0,008821** 0,000129** 0,000015* 0,648002** 1,009654** 7,64
53 0,000696 0,009805** 0,000161** 0,000044** 1,140210** 3,849740** 7,01
54 0,000398 0,004967** 0,000107** 0,000003 0,266530** 0,480544** 3,24
55 0,000037 0,009627** 0,000139** 0,000010 0,518172** 0,794861* 3,86
56 0,000210 0,014942** 0,000170** 0,000108** 0,855629** 1,725279** 1,08
57 0,000429 0,007450** 0,000179** 0,000017** 0,429604** 2,473198** 12,86
58 0,000385** 0,006954** 0,000189** 0,000010** 0,491210** 0,718748** 6,44
59 0,000551 0,007730** 0,000253** 0,000004 0,229570** 0,237471** 2,13
60 0,000270 0,008247** 0,000112** 0,000001 0,327870** 0,370144** 2,49
61 0,000975* 0,013523** 0,000176** 0,000025 0,483996** 2,539710** 1,21
62 0,000763** 0,005644** 0,000105** 0,000001 0,310431** 0,257974** 6,28
63 0,000080 0,004747** 0,000093** 0,000004* 0,453089** 0,922374** 4,41
64 0,000421 0,001753** 0,000122** 0,000000 0,256621** 0,317692** 2,41
65 0,000399 0,007069** 0,000121** 0,000025** 0,807689** 1,646781** 1,44
66 0,000322 0,007495** 0,000113** 0,000006 0,532255** 0,735960** 3,05
67 0,002328 0,006563 0,000259 0,000004 0,081158 0,034710 13,13
68 0,001318* 0,010106** 0,000195** 0,000003 0,328610** 0,391733** 1,66
69 0,001144** 0,009141** 0,000197** 0,000016** 0,569769** 0,797812** 2,70
70 -0,000217** 0,011143** 0,000159** 0,000214** 0,015643 16,593616* 3,31
71 0,000831* 0,010479** 0,000168** 0,000007 0,539331** 1,714445 2,91
72 0,000684 0,003646** 0,000158** 0,000000 0,264416** 0,196433** 6,06
73 0,000830** 0,012073** 0,000104** 0,000082** 1,263259** 2,909492 2,95
74 0,000318 0,007707** 0,000123** 0,000005 0,415593** 0,990330** 2,07
75 0,000801 0,004110** 0,000216** 0,000001 0,329465** 0,565500** 3,21
76 0,000259 0,007227** 0,000179** 0,000003 0,358411** 0,352879 3,54
77 0,000297 0,005903** 0,000144** 0,000006 0,280831** 0,527107** 5,27
78 0,001124* 0,011166** 0,000217** 0,000021 0,626097** 1,111593 3,63
79 0,000378 0,008791** 0,000141** 0,000003 0,315523** 0,413985** 2,90
80 -0,000031 0,008275 0,000108 0,000022 0,003433 0,377380 10,43
81 0,000828** 0,005752** 0,000110** 0,000005** 0,165209** 0,225023** 1,37
82 0,000016 0,006422** 0,000177** 0,000012** 0,338610** 1,834843** 6,33
83 0,000415 0,007782** 0,000124** 0,000002 0,296313** 0,011812 3,64
84 0,000401 0,005160** 0,000101** 0,000004** 0,426593** 0,517322** 1,30
85 0,000494 0,002321** 0,000093** 0,000000 0,275580** 0,259745** 5,16
86 0,000398 0,007114** 0,000072** 0,000003 0,150148** 0,093268** 3,25
87 0,003429** 0,020237** 0,000541** 0,000001 0,418237** 0,420424** 4,32
88 0,000316 0,004931** 0,000184** 0,000011* 0,698633** 1,195637 2,12
89 0,000265 0,038437** 0,000218** 0,001783** 0,602895** 2,741132* 1,17
90 -0,000004 0,008261** 0,000115** 0,000006* 0,159434** 0,250851** 5,56
91 0,001053** 0,008996** 0,000137** 0,000025** 0,889680** 2,407741** 7,87
92 0,002545** 0,029124** 0,000449** 0,000298** 0,188494** 0,762121** 2,06
93 0,000493 0,010147** 0,000180** 0,000029** 1,005279** 3,151976** 1,73
"*" and "**" indicate signiﬁcance at 90% and 95% levels of conﬁdence respectively.























































































v m2I x p χ2
3 pµla
v
22 0,006114 0,010793 0,000120** 0,00000000 0,258** 2,87 0,054 3,83 -
54 0,004448** 0,007292 0,000095** 0,00000000 0,225** 3,19 0,040 4,86 -
76 0,007274** 0,037411** 0,000176 0,00000000 0,316** 6,39** 0,002 2,79 0,000075
65 0,006773** 0,018750** 0,000099 0,00000000 0,236** 5,20** 0,005 5,49 0,000094
24 0,005370** 0,010659** 0,000063** 0,00000072 0,130** 3,85** 0,021 4,84 0,000222
44 0,006229** 0,013975** 0,000120** 0,00000027 0,258** 3,84** 0,021 1,42 0,000294
77 0,005522** 0,010229** 0,000152** 0,00000000 0,278** 2,60** 0,069 1,18 0,000705
31 0,004146** 0,008846** 0,000102** 0,00000000 0,223** 4,00** 0,018 5,11 0,000159
35 0,007926** 0,056664** 0,000264** 0,00000945** 0,373** 5,24** 0,005 2,57 0,000297






v m2I x p χ2
3 pµla
v
22 0,006079** 0,012897 0,000120** 0,00000000 0,347** 2,927 0,051 1,40 -
54 0,004046** 0,004738* 0,000101** 0,000000000 0,215** 2,04 0,115 0,25 -
76 0,004747** 0,003933** 0,000129** 0,00000000 0,161** 0,80 0,309 3,20 -
65 0,006844** 0,009940 0,000082** 0,00000000 0,203** 3,95* 0,019 3,09 -
24 0,005668** 0,012285** 0,000057** 0,00000208** 0,082* 3,86** 0,021 3,57 0,000253
44 0,005301** 0,017626** 0,000104** 0,00000142 0,187** 4,87** 0,008 0,33 0,000134
77 0,004466** 0,011211** 0,000113** 0,00000163** 0,134** 3,89** 0,020 1,38 0,000224
31 0,004062** 0,010295** 0,000095** 0,00000000 0,210** 4,42** 0,012 2,02 0,000122
35 0,005758** 0,040619** 0,000217** 0,00000623 0,329** 5,01** 0,007 2,15 0,000269






v m2I x p χ2
3 pµla
v
22 0,006560** 0,008112 0,0001223** 0,00000159 0,203** 3,80 0,022 2,57 -
54 0,004790** 0,014366** 0,0000852** 0,00000000 0,229** 4,28** 0,014 4,71 0,000196
76 0,008524** 0,033431** 0,000204** 0,00000046 0,257** 5,29** 0,005 2,86 0,000168
65 0,006520** 0,021978** 0,000116** 0,00000000 0,238** 5,36** 0,005 3,70 0,000103
24 0,004933** 0,007796** 0,000067** 0,00000000 0,142** 3,21** 0,039 3,48 0,000302
44 0,007154** 0,012640** 0,000134** 0,00000000 0,220** 3,22** 0,038 2,52 0,000485
77 0,006586** 0,009886** 0,000187** 0,00000000 0,224** 2,08** 0,111 0,27 0,001099
31 0,004208** 0,007810** 0,000106* 0,00000000 0,228** 3,65** 0,025 3,33 0,000198
35 0,009750** 0,029675* 0,000278** 0,00000718 0,272** 4,69** 0,009 3,08 0,000271
82 0,005623** 0,013323* 0,000170** 0,00000000 0,228** 3,62* 0,026 4,46 0,000346
"*" and "**" indicate signiﬁcance at 90% and 95% levels of conﬁdence respectively.



















































































Data extension validity Contributions
Tauchen 90-day T-bills Explains




and stocks E(Rt)  = 0 Less favorable GMM test
Smith (1994)
Lamoureux 10 NYSE MDH explanation for
and stocks Cov(It,It−1)  = 0 Unfavorable GARCH eﬀects?
Lastrapes
(1994)
Andersen IBM common Non-informed Unfavorable to Volume decomposition:
(1996) stocks part of volume standard MDH; informed versus
Modiﬁed MDH uninformed part
does better. of volume
with market maker
Roskelley Dow Jones30 Cov(It,It−1)  = 0 Unfavorable Moment
(2001) stocks simpliﬁcation
Li and Dow Jones30 Extend Rejection of Non-informed traders
Wu (2006) stocks Andersen (1996): Andersen (1996); have negative impact
Non-informed part Validation on Cov(R2
t,Vt)
of return volatility of their model.
MDHL model FTSE 100 Extend Favorable Liquidity arbitragers
Stocks TP (1983): to standard MDH are strategic agents
and not noisy traders;
Information and to MDHL Extends standard MDH
and Liquidity by accounting for
shocks liquidity shocks;
Volume decomposition;
Proposes a new liquidity
measure.
Table 7: Paper contributions compared to previous literature.
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